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I. INTRODUCTION
The existence of a duty is the threshold issue in negligence
law. Defining a duty and the scope of its existence and effect is a
difficult task that courts routinely must perform. The existence of
a duty, especially a person's duty to protect another person from
harm, has been the source of legal debate for over 100 years. Min-
nesota courts, as well as other state and federal courts, have thus
carefully analyzed the duty of one person to protect another person
from harm.
The duty to protect exists almost exclusively in situations
where the parties stand in some special relationship to one an-
other. Currently, Minnesota only recognizes seven relationships as
"special. 2 Thus, the duty to protect has been relatively limited by
Minnesota decisions.3
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in Gilbertson v. Leininger,
4 lim-
ited the duty to protect further by correctly ruling that social hosts
have no duty to protect their guests. This decision is not only con-
sistent with existing Minnesota law, but is also supported by strong
public policy considerations.5 Furthermore, this decision allows
hosts to continue to entertain guests in their homes without the
threat of litigation by injured guests.6
This case note examines a social host's duty to protect one's
1. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Minn. 1989);
Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Minn. 1984); Errico v. Southland Corp.,
509 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) rev. denied, No. C3-93-980 (Minn. Jan.
27, 1994).
2. Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n , 539 N.W.2d 789, 792
(Minn. 1995) (recognizing the innkeeper/guest relationship as "special"); Harper
v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993) (recognizing the common car-
rier/passenger relationship as "special"); Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169-70 (recogniz-
ing the parking ramp owner/customer relationship as "special"); Leaon v. Wash-
ington County, 397 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 1986) (recognizing the possessor of
land/permissive entrant relationship as "special"); Ponticas v. K.M.S. Inv. Co., 331
N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983) (recognizing the landlord/tenant relationship as
"special"); N.W. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 387, 53 N.W.2d 17, 19
(1952) (recognizing the hospital/patient relationship as "special"); Lundman v.
McKnown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Harper v. Herman,
499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993)) (recognizing the custodial relationship as
"special").
3. See discussion infra Part II.B.
4. 599 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1999).
5. See discussion infra Parts IV.A., IV.B.
6. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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guests. It does not explore social host liability under the Minnesota
Civil Damage Act. Part II presents the history of the duty concept
in negligence law, specifically the development in England. It also
focuses on the development of duty in Minnesota law." Part III de-
tails the facts of and the court's decision in the Gilbertson case.9 Part
IV is an analysis of the current law, public policy considerations,
and also presents guidelines to follow should the imposition of a
duty to protect become necessary in the future.1 ° Part V concludes
that the Minnesota Supreme Court was correct deciding to not im-
pose a duty to protect on the social hosts in Gilbertson.'
II. HISTORY
A. Development Of Duty-English Law
In early English law, there was no concept of duty. 2 Instead,
liability was imposed with little or no regard for the defendant's
fault. However, as negligence law branched off from other areas
of tort liability, courts were forced to develop the notion of duty.14
Three English cases 15 helped foster the duty concept. 6 Generally,
the duty concept stated that a plaintiff could not bring a negligence
action unless the defendat owed the plaintiff a duty.
Even though the concept of a duty was thus established, a
definition had not yet been formulated. Lord Esher, in Heaven v.
Pender,s made the first attempt to define the term "duty."'9 Lord
Esher's definition stated that whenever people recognize that an-
7. Infta Part II.A.
8. Infra Part II.B, C.
9. Infra Parts III.A., III.B.
10. Infra Parts III.A., III.B., III.C.
11. Infta Part V.
12. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, § 53, at 357 (5th
ed. 1984).
13. Id. In fact, negligence law in early England was more like strict liability in
that if the defendant's act was found to be wrongful, then the defendant was abso-
lutely found liable for all damage that resulted from the act. Id.
14. Id. Without some sort of duty on the part of the defendant, there could
be no liability and the plaintiff could not recover. Id.
15. Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (K-B. 1842); Langridge v.
Levy, 150 Eng. Rep. 863, (1836) affld, 150 Eng. Rep. 1458 (1838), Vaughan v.
Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (1837).
16. KEETON ETAL., supra note 12, § 53, at 357.
17. Id. See also Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 402; Langridge, 150 Eng. Rep. at
863; Vaughan, 132 Eng. Rep. at 490 (holding that a plaintiff must be owed a duty).
18. Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883).
19. KEETON ETAL., supra note 12, § 53, at 358.
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other person may be injured if they do not use ordinary care, a
duty to act accordingly is created.•0 Lord Esher's definition of duty,• • •21
while an excellent first attempt, is recognized today as too broad.
Although no universal test has been formulated, currently, duty
can be defined as "an obligation, to which the law will give recogni-
tion and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct to-
wards another."
2 3
B. To Whom And Under What Circumstances A Duty Is Owed
Despite the fact that a definition of duty has been established,
it is not so well settled to whom and under what circumstances a
24duty is owed. Indeed, most negligence cases involve a question of
20. Heaven, 11 Q.B.D. 503, 509. See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 53, at
358. Lord Esher stated that,
[w]henever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with
regard to another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would
at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own
conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of in-
jury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary
care and skill to avoid such danger.
Heaven, 11 Q.B.D. at 509. See also KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 53, at 358.
21. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 53, at 358. The formula is much too
broad because there are numerous situations in which a person absolutely has no
duty to act on behalf of another. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 356.
24. As evidence for this proposition, one need only look at the massive
amount of litigation that has already occurred, and will continue to occur in the
future, regarding the existence of a duty. E.g., Sulik v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 847
F. Supp. 747, 749 (D. Minn. 1994); Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n,
539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995); Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474
(Minn. 1993); Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168 (Minn. 1989); An-
ders v. Trester, 562 N.W.2d 45, 47 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997); Errico v. Southland
Corp., 509 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) rev. denied, No. C3-93-980
(Minn. Jan. 27, 1994); Spitzak v. Hylands, Ltd., 500 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993), rev. denied, No. C3-92-2217 (Minn. July 15, 1993). Because the exis-
tence of a legal duty is the threshold issue in all negligence cases, the issue is fre-
quently litigated in negligence lawsuits. Parties have argued about the existence of
a duty in numerous situations. See generally Sulik, 847 F. Supp. at 749 (arguing
whether a merchant has a duty to protect its customers); Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at
792 (arguing whether person in custody of another has a duty to protect); Harper,
499 N.W.2d at 474 (arguing whether a social host has a duty to protect his guest);
Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168 (arguing whether a parking ramp owner has a duty to
protect patrons); Anders, 562 N.W.2d at 47 (arguing whether merchant has a duty
to protect customers); Errico, 509 N.W.2d at 587 (arguing whether a merchant has
a duty to protect customers); Spitzak, 500 N.W.2d at 156 (arguing whether land-
lord had duty to protect a tenant).
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25whether or not a duty is owed and to whom that duty is owed.
There are numerous situations where a defendant simply owes
no duty to anyone, unless the defendant has assumed a duty to actS • 26
or stands in some special relationship to the plaintiff. This is
known as the nonaction or "nonfeasance" rule. 7
The duty question is especially difficult when analyzing
whether a duty is owed to a third person. Various fact situations
can create a duty to protect when (1) the defendant innocently
creates the risk or harm,28 (2) the defendant's relationship to the
29plaintiff creates a duty, (3) the defendant's affirmative action cre-
ates a duty,30 (4) the defendant's undertaking creates a duty,31 and
32(5) the defendant's undertaking creates a duty to third persons.
In many cases, the defendant himself does not cause the harm
to the plaintiff.33 Rather, the defendant fails to protect the plaintiff
from the risk of some other harm.34 The duty to protect question
is, "could [the defendant] have prevented the injury by a warning
or by exercising the control he had over the attacker. .. .,,35 Usu-
ally, the question is not whether the defendant should rescue the
plaintiff already in danger, but whether defendant should exercise
25. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 53, at 356. Keeton defines the duty ques-
tion as dealing with "the problem of the relation between individuals which im-
poses upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of another...." Id. Keeton con-
cludes, "[i] n other words, 'duty' is a question of whether the defendant is under
any obligation for the benefit of a particular plaintiff." Id. See also supra note 24.
26. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAw OFToRTs, § 314, at 853 (2000).
27. Id. § 315, at 855.
28. Id. § 316, at 856. When a defendant either knows or should know that he
has caused physical harm to the plaintiff, the defendant has a duty to avoid further
harm even if the harm was caused without fault. Id.
29. Id. § 317, at 857. Sometimes the defendant's relationship with the plain-
tiff creates a duty. Id. These relationships are characterized as "special," and in-
clude, (1) the carrier/passenger relationship, (2) the innkeeper/guest relation-
ship, (3) the landowner/invitee relationship, (4) the custodian/ward relationship,
and (5) the employer/employee relationship. Id.
30. Id. § 318, at 859. When a defendant affirmatively acts to help a person, he
must act with reasonable care. Id.
31. Id. § 319, at 860. "The general rule that undertakings can create a duty of
care is often expressed by saying one who voluntarily assumes a duty must then
perform that duty with reasonable care." Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 323 (1965).
32. Id. § 321, at 869-70. In certain situations, the defendant's undertaking
with respect to one person may impose on him a duty of care for another person.
Id. at 871.
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care to prevent the harm to the plaintiff in the first place. 6
All state jurisdictions have various rules regarding when a per-
son has a duty to protect another by preventing some recognized
harm.37 Despite the technical differences among the rules, the pre-
36. Id.
37. Moye v. A.G. Gaston Motels, Inc., 499 So. 2d 1368, 1370 (Ala. 1986) (stat-
ing that under Alabama law, a person has no duty to protect another from the
criminal acts of third parties absent a special relationship); Parish v. Truman, 603
P.2d 120, 122 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that under Arizona law, the duty to
protect arises when a special relationship exists between the parties); First Com-
mercial Trust Co. v. Lorcin Eng'g, Inc., 900 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Ark. 1995) (holding
that under Arkansas law, the duty to protect arises when a special relationship ex-
ists between the parties); Davidson v. City of Westminster, 649 P.2d 894, 897 (Cal.
1982) (holding that under California law, the duty to protect arises when a special
relationship exists between the parties); Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198, 1208
(Colo. 1989) (holding that under Colorado law, the duty to protect arises if a spe-
cial relationship exists between the parties); Todd M. v. Richard L., 696 A.2d 1063,
1072 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that under Connecticut law, the duty to
protect arises when a special relationship exists between the parties); Parrotino v.
City of Jacksonville, 612 So. 2d 586, 589 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that
under Florida law, the duty to protect arises if a special relationship exists between
the parties); Associated Health Sys. v. Jones, 366 S.E.2d 147, 151 (Ga. Ct. App.
1988) (holding that under Georgia law, the duty to protect arises if a special rela-
tionship exists between the parties); Doe v. Grosvenor Props. Ltd., 829 P.2d 512,
515-16 (Haw. 1992) (adopting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 as the
basis for Hawaii's duty to protect); Sterling v. Bloom, 723 P.2d 755, 769 (Idaho
1986) (holding that under Idaho law, the duty to protect arises if a special rela-
tionship exists between the parties); Osborne v. Stages Music Hall, Inc., 726
N.E.2d 728, 732 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that under Illinois law, the duty to
protect arises when a special relationship exists between the parties); Gunter v. Vil-
lage Pub, 606 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that under Indiana
law, the duty to protect arises when: (1) the party to be charged has knowledge of
the circumstance or situation surrounding the relationship or (2) if the party to be
charged gratuitously or voluntarily assumes a duty); Mastbergen v. City of Sheldon,
515 N.W.2d 3, 4 (Iowa 1994) (holding that under Iowa law, the duty to protect
arises when a special relationship exists between the parties); C.J.W. v. State, 853
P.2d 4, 9 (Kan. 1993) (adopting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS §§ 315-20 as
the basis for the imposition of a duty to protect); Grimes v. Hettinger, 566 S.W.2d
769, 775 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that under Kentucky law, the duty to protect
arises if a special relationship exists between the parties); Mixon v. Davis, 732 So.
2d 628, 631 (La. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that under Louisiana law, the duty to
protect arises when a special relationship exists between the parties); Bryan R. v.
Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 738 A.2d 839, 845 (Me. 1999)
(holding that under Maine law, the duty to protect arises if a special relationship
exists between the parties); Scott v. Watson, 359 A.2d 548, 552 (Md. 1976) (hold-
ing that under Maryland law, the duty to protect arises if a special relationship ex-
ists between the parties); Lyon v. Morphew, 678 N.E.2d 1306, 1309 (Mass. 1997)
(holding that under Massachusetts law, the duty to protect arises if a special rela-
tionship exists between the parties); Williams v. Cunningham Drug Stores, Inc.,
418 N.W.2d 381, 383 (Mich. 1988) (holding that under Michigan law, the duty to
protect arises when a special relationship exists between the parties); Claybon v.
1358 [Vol. 27:2
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Midwest Petroleum Co., 819 S.W.2d 742, 744 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
under Missouri law, there is a duty to protect when: (1) a special relationship ex-
ists or (2) when special facts and circumstances exist); Krieg v. Massey, 781 P.2d
277, 279 (Mont. 1989) (holding that under Montana law, the duty to protect arises
if a special relationship of control exists between the parties); Hamilton v. City of
Omaha, 498 N.W.2d 555, 560 (Neb. 1993) (adopting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 315 as the basis for the Nebraska rule which states that the duty to pro-
tect arises when (1) a special relation exists between the actor and the third per-
son which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct or
(2) a special relation exists between the actor and the other which gives to the
other a right to protection); Scialabba v. Brandise Constr. Co., 921 P.2d 928, 930
(Nev. 1996) (holding that under Nevada law, the duty to protect exists if the rela-
tionship between the parties has an element of control); Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d
272, 278 (N.H. 1995) (holding that under New Hampshire law, the duty to protect
may arise when a special relationship exists between the parties); Atamian v. Su-
permarkets Gen. Corp., 369 A.2d 38, 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (holding
that under NewJersey law, a duty to protect may arise in certain situations if a spe-
cial relationship exists or special circumstances exist); Rummel v. Edgemont Re-
alty Partners, Ltd., 859 P.2d 491, 494 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that under
New Mexico law, the duty to protect arises when a special relationship exists be-
tween the parties); Fay v. Assignment Am., 666 N.Y.S.2d 304, 306 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (holding that under New York law, the duty to protect arises when a special
relationship exists between the parties); Hite v. Brown, 654 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that under Ohio law, the duty to protect arises when a
special relationship exists between the parties); Wofford v. E. State Hosp., 795 P.2d
516, 519 (Okla. 1990) (holding that under Oklahoma law, the duty to protect de-
pends on the relationship of the parties and the risk involved); Keeland v. Yamhill
County, 545 P.2d 137, 139-40 (Or. Ct. App. 1976) (adopting the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 320 as Oregon's basis for the imposition of a duty to pro-
tect); Zanine v. Gallagher, 497 A.2d 1332, 1334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (holding that
under Pennsylvania law, the duty to protect exists when there is a special relation-
ship or when the risk is foreseeable); Erickson v. Lavielle, 368 N.W.2d 624, 627
(S.D. 1985) (adopting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A as South Da-
kota's basis for the imposition of a duty to protect); Newton v. Tinsley, 970 S.W.2d
490, 493 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that under Tennessee law, the duty to
protect exists when the parties have a relationship of dependence or mutual de-
pendence); Guerrero v. Mem'l. Med. Ctr. of E. Tex., 938 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1997) (holding that under Texas law, the duty to protect arises when a spe-
cial relationship exists between the parties); Bradley v. H.A. Manosh Corp., 601
A.2d 978, 981 (Vt. 1991) (holding that under Vermont law, the duty to protect
arises when a special relationship exists that gives one person control over the ac-
tions of another person); Lauritzen v. Lauritzen, 874 P.2d 861, 865 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1994) (holding that under Washington law, the duty to protect arises when a
special relationship exists between the parties); Jack v. Fritts, 457 S.E.2d 431, 435
(W. Va. 1995) (holding that under West Virginia law, the duty to protect arises if a
special relationship exists between the parties or if there is a foreseeable risk of
harm); Lloyd v. S.S. Kresge Co., 270 N.W.2d 423, 426 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) (hold-
ing that under Wisconsin law, the duty to protect arises when a special relationship
exists between the parties). Some states, however, do not necessarily recognize a
duty to protect a third person. Kanayurak v. N. Slope Borough, 677 P.2d 893, 899
n. 11 (Alaska 1984) (holding that under Alaska law, "special relationship" is just
another way of saying the amount of care required is proportional to the risk or
responsibility involved); Castellani v. Del. State Police, 751 A.2d 934, 938 (Del. Su-
2000] 1359
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vailing general rule is that a duty to protect another person is owed
when a special relationship exists between the parties and the risk
of harm is foreseeable. s
C. Minnesota History
Minnesota lagged behind the English law in recognizing the
concept of a duty. However, in 1907, the Minnesota Supreme
Court was faced for the first time with the question of whether or
not a defendant has a duty to act affirmatively for the benefit of an-
other person.
1. Recognizing A Duty-Depue v. Flateau
Minnesota first recognized the existence of a duty to protect
another from a recognized harm in Depue v. Flateau."9 The Depue
court, in straying from the former no duty rule4O stated:
per. Ct. 1999) (holding that under Delaware law, the scope of duty depends on
the nature of the relationship between the parties). North Carolina and South
Carolina case law regarding the duty to protect primarily focuses on the public
duty doctrine. E.g., Hedrick v. Rains, 466 S.E.2d 281, 284 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that under the public duty doctrine a duty is owed to the general public,
not specific individuals); Wells v. City of Lynchburg, 501 S.E.2d 746, 751-52 (S.C.
Ct. App. 1998) (holding a duty is owed to the general public, not to individuals).
In addition, an extensive search of Mississippi, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Utah,
Virginia, and Wyoming case law did not provide an answer whether those states
recognized a duty to protect.
38. Supra note 37.
39. 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907). In Depue, plaintiff was a cattle sales-
man and called upon defendants at their home to inspect some cattle. Id. at 1-2.
Plaintiff was unable to inspect the cattle because it was too dark and cold. Id.
Plaintiff then asked defendants if he could spend the night and inspect the cattle
the next morning. Id. Defendants refused, but invited plaintiff to stay for dinner.
Id. After dinner, plaintiff became violently ill and fainted. Id. at 1-2. Nonetheless,
defendants put plaintiff in his cutter and started his team of horses on the way
home. Id. at 2. During the trip, plaintiff fainted again, fell off his cutter, and
nearly froze to death. Id. Plaintiff eventually sued defendants, alleging they had a
duty to protect him. Id. The Depue court basically adopted the duty formula from
an early English case, Heaven v. Pender. Id. at 2. See also Heaven v. Pender, 11
Q.B.D. 503, 508 (1883).
40. Depue, 100 Minn. at 302-303, 111 N.W. at 2 (citing Union Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Cappier, 72 Pac. 281 (Kan. 1903)).
Those duties where the court dictated merely by good morals or
by humane considerations are not within the domain of the law.
Feelings of kindness and sympathy may move the Good Samari-
tan to minister to the sick and wounded at the roadside, but the
law imposes no such obligation; and suffering humanity has no
legal complaint against those who pass by on the other side.
Id. The Depue court simply stated that the Cappier rule had no application
1360 [Vol. 27:2
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[W]henever a person is placed in such a position
with regard to another that it is obvious that, if he
does not use due care in his own conduct, he will
cause injury to that person, the duty at once arises to
exercise care commensurate with the situation in
which he thus finds himself, and with which he is
confronted, to avoid such danger; and a negligent
failure to perform the duty renders him liable for
the consequences of his neglect.4'
Thus, Minnesota imposed, for the first time, a common-law
duty to protect on people who know or should know the needs of a
42
person in their control. Stated simply, the Depue court imposed a
duty to protect on defendants who either know or should know
43that the plaintiff may be injured by nonaction.
2. "No Duty" Cases And The Special Relationship Rule
Aside from the Depue rule, Minnesota generally follows the
nonfeasance rule.44 In Delgado v. Lohmar,45 the Minnesota Supreme
to the facts of the case before it. Id.
41. Id. (citing Heaven v. Pender, 1883, 11 Q.B.D. 503). The court specifically
based its decision on the fact that defendants were aware of plaintiff's condition at
the time they failed to act. Id. at 3.
42. Id. (recognizing for the first time a duty to act affirmatively for the benefit
of another).
43. Id. (imposing a duty to act affirmatively for the benefit of another per-
son).
44. The nonfeasance rule states that a person has no duty to act for the bene-
fit of another unless a duty to act has been assumed or some special relationship
exists between the parties. DOBBS, supra note 26, § 314, at 853 (2000). Since pro-
tecting a person is nothing more than an act for the benefit of that person, it is
logical that, unless a person assumes a duty to protect or the parties stand in some
special relationship, there is no affirmative duty to protect another person. Id. See
also Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979).
45. 289 N.W.2d 479 (Minn. 1979). In Delgado, defendants were hunting near
plaintiff's land. Id. at 481. After defendants shot several grouse, they entered
plaintiffs land to retrieve them. Id. Plaintiff had not given them permission to
hunt on his land and after hearing the shotgun blasts, walked in the defendants'
general direction. Id. When plaintiff was about one hundred yards from defen-
dants, a bird flew up and two of the defendants shot at it. Id. at 482. Plaintiff was
blinded by the shotgun blast of one of the defendants. Id. Plaintiff sued defen-
dants for his resulting blindness. Id. At trial, there was some dispute as to whether
defendants saw plaintiff before they shot at the bird. Id. Thus, the Minnesota Su-
preme Court examined whether defendants' seeing plaintiff created some duty
that was breached. Id. at 483. The Supreme Court commented that ordinarily a
duty to protect cannot be imposed in the absence of a special relationship be-
tween the parties. Id. However, the court ruled that since defendants were en-
gaged in such a dangerous activity-hunting with high-powered guns-they must
2000] 1361
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Court stated that generally, 6a person has no duty to act for the pro-
tection of another person. However, the nonfeasance rule stated
in Delgado is not absolute.
Minnesota imposes a legal duty to protect another person
when (1) the parties stand in some special relationship to one an-
other and (2) the risk of injury involved is foreseeable.47 In addi-
tion, not only must the plaintiff have a special relationship with the
defendant and the risk must be foreseeable, but the plaintiff must
481also have a reasonable expectation of protection.
In order for a special relationship to exist, the defendant must
be in a position to protect against, and must be expected to protect
against, the threatened harm.49 In bits and pieces Minnesota has
recognized special relationships, and the corresponding legal duty
to protect, in a limited number of situations. They include: (1)
50 51common carriers/passengers; (2) innkeepers/guests; (3) posses-
take extra care. Id. at 484. The court ruled that defendants' failure to warn plain-
tiff of their actions would be negligence and remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether defendants actually saw plaintiff before firing at the bird. Id.
46. Delgado, 289 N.W.2d at 483. The Delgado court stated:
The fact that an actor realizes or should realize that action on
his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not of
itself impose upon him a duty to take such action.. unless a spe-
cial relationship exists.. between the actor and the other which
gives the other a right to protection.
Id. at 483. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
47. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Minn. 1989);
Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 27-28 (Minn. 1984); Errico v. Southland Corp.,
509 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) rev. denied, No. C3-93-980 (Minn.Jan.
27, 1994).
48. Donaldson, v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792
(Minn. 1995) (rejecting existence of a duty, in part, because the decedent "had no
reasonable expectation that the YWCA would protect her from committing sui-
cide").
49. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168. The Erickson court created its own hypotheti-
cal to examine the duty issue. Id. The court stated:
If the law is to impose a duty on A to protect B from C's criminal acts, the
law usually looks for a special relationship between A and B, a situation
where B had in some way entrusted his or her safety to A and A has ac-
cepted that entrustment. This special relationship also assumes that the
harm represented by C is something that A is in a position to protect
against and should be expected to protect against.
Id. Typically, plaintiff is in some respect particularly vulnerable and dependent on
defendant, and therefore, defendant holds considerable power over plaintiffs wel-
fare. KEETON ETAL., supra note 12, § 56, at 374.
50. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 (Minn. 1993); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
51. Donaldson, 539 N.W.2d at 792 (citing Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
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sors of land/persons permissively on the land;" (4) hospi-
53 5
tal/patient; (5) landlord/tenant;14  (6) parking ramp
owner/customer;55 and (7) custodial relationships. 6  Generally
these "special relationships" include a financial benefit for the de-
fendant upon whom the duty to protect is imposed.57
3. Social Host Duty To Protect Cases--Gilbertson v. Leininger
And Harper v. Herman
The existence of an affirmative duty to protect has been con-
tested numerous times in Minnesota courts. In Gilbertson v. Lein-
inger, the plaintiff attempted to convince the court to extend the
duty to protect to a social host.59 However, in 1993, the Minnesota
Supreme Court ruled on the social host duty to protect issue Harper
52. Leaon v. Wash. County, 397 N.W.2d 867, 873 (Minn. 1986); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OFTORTS § 318 (1965).
53. N.W. Hosp. of Minneapolis, 236 Minn. 384, 387, 53 N.W.2d 17, 19 (Minn.
1952); Roettger v. United Hosp. of St. Paul, 380 N.W.2d 856, 859-60 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1986).
54. Ponticas v. K.M.S. Inv. Co., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983); Vermes v.
Am. Dist. Tel. Co., 312 Minn. 33, 41-42, 251 N.W.2d 101,105-06 (1977).
55. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169-70.
56. Lundman v. McKnown, 530 N.W.2d 807, 820 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 314A (1965).
57. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 n. 2 (quoting W. PAGE KEETON
ET. AL., PROSSERAND KEETON ON TORTS, § 56 at 374 (5th ed. 1984)). Keeton says:
In addition such [special] relations have often involved some existing or
potential economic advantage to the defendant. Fairness in such cases
thus may require the defendant to use his power to help the plaintiff,
based upon the plaintiffs expectation of protection, which itself may be
based upon the defendant's expectation of financial gain.
Id.
58. Negligence cases alleging a duty to protect are frequently litigated be-
cause so few special relationships are recognized in Minnesota. See generally Sulik
v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 747, 749 (D. Minn. 1994) (arguing about
whether merchant has a duty to protect customers); Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599
N.W.2d 127, 130-31 (Minn. 1999) (arguing about whether social host has a duty to
protect a guest); Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n, 539 N.W.2d 789,
792 (Minn. 1995) (arguing about whether women's home had a duty to protect a
non-custodial guest); Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474 (arguing about whether social
host had a duty to protect a guest); Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168 (arguing about
whether parking ramp owner had a duty to protect patrons); Errico v. Southland
Corp., 509 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) rev. denied, No. C3-93-980
(Minn. Jan. 27, 1994) (arguing about whether merchant had a duty to protect cus-
tomers).
59. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 130. Plaintiff brought suit claiming defendants
had a duty to protect her because, as social hosts, they had custody of her under
circumstances in which she could not protect herself. Id. at 131.
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v. Herman.60 In the Harper case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
stated that a social host owner of a boat had no duty to protect his61
guest. Thus, prior to Gilbertson, Minnesota courts have already re-fused to impose a blanket duty to protect on social hosts.
III. THE GILBERTSON DECISION
A. The Facts
Susan Gilbertson was a guest at the home of Richard Leininger
62andJacqueline Hess for a Thanksgiving holiday celebration. Dur-
63ing the course of the evening, Gilbertson drank one bottle of wine
and one beer.64 After the party, Gilbertson decided to spend the
night at Leininger's house.65 During the night, Gilbertson left the
living room couch and slept in Leininger's son's bedroom. 66 When
60. Harper, 499 N.W.2d 472. In Harper, plaintiff was a guest on defendant's
boat. Id. at 473. Defendant was an experienced boat owner and considered him-
self to be in charge of the boat's occupants, while plaintiff had some experience in
swimming generally, but had no formal training with regard to diving. Id. Defen-
dant docked the boat near an island. Id. The bottom of the lake was not visible
from the boat. Id. at 473-74. Plaintiff, without warning, dove off the side of the
boat into approximately two to three feet of water. Id. at 474. Plaintiff struck the
bottom of the lake with his head, severed his spinal cord, and as a result, was ren-
dered a C6 quadriplegic. Id. Plaintiff brought suit, alleging that defendant had a
duty to protect him by warning him of the shallowness of the water. Id. The trial
court granted defendant's summary judgment motion, holding that the law im-
poses no such duty. Id. The court of appeals reversed, holding that defendant
voluntarily assumed a duty to protect plaintiff by allowing him on the boat. Id.
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that Minne-
sota law does not impose on social hosts a duty to protect guests. Id. at 475.
61. Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 475. The Harper court held that Minnesota law does
not impose on social hosts a duty to protect guests. Id. The court was mainly con-
cerned with the lack of a recognized special relationship between the parties. Id.
at 474. Specifically, the court focused on the custodial nature of the relationship
between Herman and Harper. Id. The court stated that a special relationship
could exist between Harper and Herman only if "Herman had custody of Harper
under circumstances in which Harper was deprived of normal opportunities to
protect himself." Id. The court concluded that the evidence did not establish that
Harper was particularly vulnerable or that he could not protect himself or that
Herman had considerable power over Harper. Id. The absence of these elements
precluded the imposition of a duty to protect. Id.
62. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 128. Defendants Richard Leininger andJacque-
line Hess worked with Plaintiff Gilbertson at Mystic Lake Casino as blackjack deal-
ers. Id.
63. The celebration party was actually held after Thanksgiving, on November
26, 1995. Id.
64. Id. at 129.
65. Id.
66. Hess provided Gilbertson with a pillow and blanket and told her that she
1364 [Vol. 27:2
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Gilbertson awoke at 9:00 a.m. the next morning, Leininger and
Hess noticed dried blood under her nose and informed her of the67
same. Gilbertson touched the dried blood and returned up-
stars.6 Leininger and Hess then left Gilbertson alone in the house
69for the morning.
Leininger and Hess found Gilbertson sleeping upon their re-
turn. 70 Around 3:00 p.m., Gilbertson returned downstairs and Lein-
inger and Hess noticed that she had not yet cleaned up. At this
point, Leininger and Hess wondered whether something might be
wrong." At 4:30 p.m., Hess called a nurse help line for advice as
well as her friend, Christine Tollefson.75 Tollefson instructed Hess
to call 911, which Hess did immediately.
74
When the paramedics arrived, they believed Gilbertson was in-. 75
toxicated, but still transported her to the hospital. At the hospital,
the doctor noticed a large bruise on the back of Gilbertson's head
and ordered a CT scan. The CT scan revealed an acute subdural
could sleep on the couch that night. Id. Also during the night, Gilbertson walked
into Leininger's and Hess' bedroom, waking Leininger. Id. Although Gilbertson's
behavior was strange, Leininger and Hess thought nothing of it. Id. Leininger
found Gilbertson in his son's bed the next morning. Id. Hess testified that
Gilbertson probably wandered into the boy's bedroom because she had slept there
previously. Id.
67. Id. Leininger and Hess also noticed some dried blood on the pillow and
blanket Gilbertson had used the previous night. Id.
68. Id. As Gilbertson was walking up the stairs, Leininger and Hess noticed
that she had urinated and defecated in her pants. Id.
69. Leininger and Hess decided to leave the house for the morning to allow
Gilbertson to clean up in private. Id.
70. Id. Leininger and Hess returned between 1:30 and 1:45 p.m. Id. Neither
Leininger nor Hess were concerned about Gilbertson since they were unsure when
Gilbertson stopped drinking the night before or when she finally went to bed. Id.
71. Id. Leininger then told Gilbertson that she did not look very good and
that she should look in a mirror. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. Hess informed the nurse that Gilbertson had drunk a "jug" of wine
the night before and was now disoriented and had dried blood on her face. Id.
The nurse, presumably believing Gilbertson was still intoxicated, told Hess to
clean Gilbertson up, walk her around, and give her caffeine to stimulate her. Id.
74. Id. at 129-130. Tollefson disagreed with the nurse's suggested action and
told Hess to call "9-1-1" for help immediately. Id.
75. Id. at 130. Gilbertson indicated to the emergency personnel that she did
not wish to go to the hospital, so they got permission from Dr. Nancy Schlehner,
the emergency room physician, for an emergency hold for transport. Id. A
"transport hold" is used when paramedics believe it is in the patient's best interest
to receive further medical treatment, even if the patient refuses. Id. The para-
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hematoma and a skull fracture.77 Following treatment for her inju-
ries, Gilbertson filed a negligence suit against Leininger and Hess."
The trial court found Leininger and Hess negligent and the court
of appeals affirmed.80
B. The Court's Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court and
court of appeals." The Supreme Court held that Minnesota does
not recognize social hosts' duty to protect their guests."' The
court's decision was based on the fact that a social host/guest rela-
tionship was not a recognized "special relationship."
8 3
Specifically, the court found that Leininger and Hess did not
have custody and control of Gilbertson while she was a guest in the
814house. Furthermore, the court found that Leininger and Hess
were in no position to protect against, and were not expected to
85protect against, Gilbertson's injuries .
77. Id. Gilbertson required an operation to remove the hematoma and re-
duce the swelling in her brain. Id. Even though Gilbertson apparently made a
very good recovery, she continues to suffer residual damage from the injury. Id.
78. Id. Gilbertson alleged that Leininger and Hess should have known earlier
in the day that she was seriously hurt and their delay in seeking medical treatment
increased the severity of her head injury. Id.
79. The trial court also denied defendants' motions for judgment notwith-
standing the verdict and motion for a new trial. Id.
80. The court of appeals found there was sufficient evidence for the jury to
impose a legal duty on Leininger and Hess. Id. The court of appeals held that the
jury could have reasonably concluded that Gilbertson's increasing confusion
throughout the course of the day, as well as her inability to care for herself, could
support the conclusion that defendants' delay in seeking medical attention was the
proximate cause of Gilbertson's injury. Gilbertson v. Leininger, 1998 WL 764081
at * 1 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd 599 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1999). Thus, because
the jury could have reasonably found that defendants' action or inaction was the
proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, the court of appeals could not reverse the
trial court's verdict. Id.
81. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 132.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 131.
84. Id. The court stated that Leininger and Hess did not have physical cus-
tody and control of Gilbertson. Id. Rather, she was merely a dinner guest who
happened to spend the night at their home. Id. The court commented that in
order to have custody and control over plaintiff, defendant must have "consider-
able power over [plaintiff's] welfare." Id. (citing Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d
472, 475 (Minn. 1993)).
85. Id. at 131-32. The court decided that Leininger and Hess were not in a
position to protect against Gilbertson's injury because they had no medical ex-
perience or training, particularly in recognizing and treating a subdural hema-
toma. Id. at 131. Furthermore, the court commented that Gilbertson could not
1366 [Vol. 27:2
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A. Gilbertson Is A Correct Interpretation Of Minnesota Law
The Gilbertson holding is a correct interpretation of existing
Minnesota law.86 Under current law, in order to impose a duty to
protect, the parties must stand in some special relationship and the
risk of harm must be foreseeable. 87
1. Special Relationship
Minnesota recognizes only certain relationships88 as "special"
and the Minnesota Supreme Court previously decided that social
hosts have no duty to protect guests. 89 Thus, the plaintiff in
Gilbertson tried to persuade the court that her relationship with de-
fendants was somehow "special.' The plaintiff alleged that her re-
lationship with defendants was custodial in nature while she was a
guest in their home. This was the only possible relationship ap-
plicable under the facts of the case.
The plaintiff alleged she was under the custody of defendants
to the extent that she was deprived of the normal opportunities of
have had any reasonable expectation that Leininger and Hess protect her from
injuring herself. Id. at 132. The court stated that because a social host/guest rela-
tionship was not "special" and Leininger and Hess did not have custody or control
of Gilbertson, no duty to protect existed. Id.
86. Existing Minnesota law states that a duty to protect arises of if: (1) a spe-
cial relationship exists and (2) the risk of harm is foreseeable. E.g., Erickson v.
Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Minn. 1989); Delgado v. Lohmar, 289
N.W.2d 479, 483-84 (Minn. 1979). Since the social host/guest relationship is not
"special," no duty to protect exists. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474-75
(Minn. 1993) (stating that social host owner of boat had no duty to protect his
guest on the boat from possible injury).
87. - Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168-69.
88. Common carriers/passengers; innkeepers/guests; possessors of
land/persons allowed on the land; hospital/patient; landlord/tenant; parking
ramp owner/customer; and custodial relationships. Donaldson v. Young Women's
Christian Ass'n, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995); Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474;
Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
89. Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 475.
90. If plaintiffs relationship with defendants was not one of the seven recog-
nized special relationships, then her negligence claim would fail because defen-
dants had no duty to protect her. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168-69 (Minn. 1989);
Lundgren v. Fultz, 354 N.W.2d 25, 27 (Minn. 1984); Errico v. Southland Corp.,
509 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) rev. denied, No. C3-93-980 (Minn.Jan.
27, 1994).
91. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131. Incidentally, this is the exact same claim
that plaintiff in Harpermade. Harper, 499 N.W.2d at 474. The Minnesota Supreme
Court rejected plaintiff's claim in that case. Id. at 475.
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92self-protection. In essence, what plaintiff attempted was to turn
her mere physical presence in defendants' home into a custodial
relationship. The Supreme Court correctly recognized that plain-
tiff had not entrusted her safety to defendants, defendants had not
accepted any entrustment, and plaintiff was not under the physical
custody or control of defendants.94 The absence of these elements
defeated plaintiff's claim that her relationship with the defendants
was custodial.9 5 Therefore, plaintiffs relationship with defendants
was not "special."
2. Foreseeability Of Risk Involved
One element untouched by the court was the foreseeability of
the risk involved. 96 Even if the court ruled that the defendants' re-
lationship with the plaintiff was "special," the foreseeability of the
particular risk involved-suffering a skull fracture and subdural
hematoma from a fall after a night of drinking-seems too remote
to impose a duty.97
The possibility that a guest may suffer a subdural hematoma
and skull fracture is too remote to be construed as foreseeable.9
92. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
314A (1965).
93. Appellant's Br. at 9, Gilbertson (No. C9-98-646) (arguing that "the custody
exception does not apply to.. .mere physical presence in a place owned by another
person").
94. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131. In order for any special relationship to ex-
ist, plaintiff must entrust her safety to defendant and defendant must accept that
entrustment. Sulik v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 747, 750 (D. Minn.
1994) (citing Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 169). Perhaps the best indicator that plain-
tiff was not under defendants' control, such that she was deprived of the opportu-
nity to protect herself, was the fact that defendants had no authority to send her to
the hospital when the paramedics arrived. Appellant's Br. at 10, Gilbertson (No.
C9-98-646). Instead, the paramedics used an "emergency hold for transport" to
take control of plaintiff and get her to the hospital. Id. See also Gilbertson, 599
N.W.2d at 130.
95. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131-32.
96. Id. at 127-32. According to existing law, in order for a duty to protect to
be imposed, a special relationship must exist between the parties and the risk in-
volved must be foreseeable. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168-69.
97. See generally Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 100-101 (1928).
The Palsgrafdecision stated that not only must the plaintiff to whom a duty is owed
be foreseeable, but the risk involved to that particular plaintiff must also be fore-
seeable. Id. In other words, it must be foreseeable that the particular plaintiff may
be injured and the risk involved was the foreseeable cause of the injury in ques-
tion. Id.
98. The risk of harm must be one that a person could reasonably anticipate.
Austin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 277 Minn. 214, 217, 152 N.W.2d 136, 138 (Minn.
1368 [Vol. 27:2
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The same can be safely said for any medical emergency occurring
in the host's home unless the host has some specific knowledge of a
guest's medical condition.9
This is even more true in a situation where the host is unaware
that the guest has been injured, such as was the case in Gilbertson.'°
In this case, the defendants did not know that the plaintiff had in-
jured herself. TM  The plaintiff apparently struck her head at some
point during the night, although it is not clear when or where the
injury occurred. Given the fact that defendants were not doctors or
nurses or medical personnel and that they had no experience or
training in recognizing or treating subdural hematomas or skull
fractures, the injury was unforeseeable and the defendants cannot
be expected to protect against it.1°2 Thus, in Gilbertson, even if the
court held social hosts have a duty to protect their guests, Lein-
inger and Hess should not be liable because the risk of suffering a
subdural hematoma and skull fracture is unforeseeable.
B. Public Policy Supports Not Imposing A Duty To Protect On Social
Hosts
1. Unforeseeable Medical Emergencies
In addition to conforming to existing case law, the Gilbertson
decision is also supported by strong public policy considerations. If
a duty to protect is imposed on social hosts, they may be discour-
aged from inviting people into their homes for fear of possible liti-
gation, should a medical or some other emergency arise. Specifi-
cally regarding medical emergencies, the law must not force social
hosts to inquire about a guest's medical condition, medications,
and unusual behavior each time they come into the home. 04 Addi-
tionally, there are guests who have unknown medical needs and
1967). Applying the Austin rule, it is fair to say that a host cannot reasonably an-
ticipate a guest's medical emergency if no medical history is known.
99. A host would be unable to reasonably anticipate any kind of medical
emergency unless the guest's medical history is known. See generally Austin, 277
Minn. at 217, 152 N.W.2d at 138. Only when a guest's medical history is known
would the host even have an opportunity to anticipate and protect against a spe-
cific risk of harm. Id.
100. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131-32 (stating that defendants were not in a po-
sition to protect against an "unknown" injury).
101. Id. See alsoAppellant's Br. at 11, Gilbertson (No. C9-98-646).
102. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131.
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therefore an emergency can be just as unexpected for the guest as
for the social host. Therefore, if the medical emergency is un-
foreseeable for the guest, the guest cannot realistically expect the
host to protect the guest from that emergency.1
0 6
Furthermore, medical emergencies generally are unforesee-
able,0 7 and it would therefore be impossible for a host-
particularly a host with no experience or training in dealing with
medical emergencies-to protect a guest from those emergencies.
This is especially true when a medical emergency can have the
same signs and symptoms as something as common as intoxica-
tion.108 When a medical emergency has the same syptoms as intoxi-
cation, it is impossible for a host to foresee any particular risk of in-
jury and a duty to protect cannot be imposed.' °9 In a situation
where the symptoms of the injury appear to be something as com-
mon as intoxication, hosts will almost inevitably dismiss the thought
of any medical emergency and instead attribute any strange behav-
ior to the suspected intoxication.' 0
Additionally, the mere possibility that some sort of medical
emergency may occur in a host's home-rather than in the guest's
home, a restaurant, or anywhere else-cannot and must not make
the host's relationship with guests "special" for the purpose of im-
posing a duty to protect.
2. Absence Of Financial Benefit In The Social Host/Guest
Relationship
Also, the recognition of a special relationship and the corre-
sponding imposition of a duty to protect often involves financial
factors. Typically, special relationships involve some existing or
105. Id.
106. The Gilbertson court adhered to this argument. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at
132. The court stated that plaintiff could not reasonably expect defendants to
protect her against a skull fracture and subdural hematoma. Id.
107. The basic definition of "emergency" includes an element of unforesee-
ability. BoUER's LAw DICTIONARY, 1008 (3d Rev. 1984). Bouvier's Law Dictionary
states that an emergency is "an unforeseen occurrence or condition." Id.
108. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 130-31.
109. Because one of the two elements - foreseeability of the risk involved - is
not fulfilled, a duty to protect cannot be imposed. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447
N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Minn. 1989).
110. This is a safe argument because even trained medical professionals some-
times have difficulty distinguishing a medical emergency from intoxication, as was
the case in Gilbertson. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 131.
111. Appellant's Br. at 16, Gilbertson (No. C9-98-646).
112. See discussion supra Part II.C.
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potential financial advantage to the defendant.I 3  This logically
should alert the defendant to the possibility that the plaintiff may
expect some sort of protection because of the value of the financial
benefit he or she is conferring upon defendant."'
The financial benefit factor was analyzed by the Minnesota Su-
preme Court in Harper when the court declined to impose on a so-
cial host a duty to protect his guest.' 15 Therefore, because in most
situations a social host does not benefit financially from having the
guest in his home, there should be no special relationship between
the parties and a duty to protect should not be imposed on the so-
cial host.
3. Instead Of Creating A New Duty, Minnesota Should Rely On
Existing Law To Protect Guests
Finally, instead of imposing a blanket duty to protect on social
hosts, Minnesota courts should rely on existing Minnesota law to
protect guests. Then, a flood of new litigation will not appear on
court dockets because the law is settled in that area and is less con-
ducive to litigation.
As a property owner, the social host already has a duty to main-
tain a safe premises. 1 r6 The occupant of premises is bound to exer-
cise reasonable care to keep them in a safe condition for those who
come upon them by express or implied invitation.117 Such duty of
reasonable care includes the duty of making the premises safe as to
dangerous conditions or activities on the premises of which the oc-
cupant knows or should know.'
8
Therefore, under the "safe premises" rule, a social host would
113. KEETON ET AL., supra note 12, § 56, at 374.
114. Id. (stating that fairness should indicate to defendant that plaintiff may
expect some protection based on the financial benefit conferred on defendant by
plaintiff).
115. Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474 n.2 (Minn. 1993). The Harper
court ultimately concluded that defendant had not deprived plaintiff of the nor-
mal opportunities of self-protection. Id. at 474. Presumably, the court considered
that defendant obtained no financial benefit from plaintiff by allowing him on his
boat. Id. (stating that there was no evidence that defendant was benefiting finan-
cially from letting plaintiff on his boat). Thus, it would not have been fair to sub-
ject defendant to a staggering amount of financial liability if there was no financial
benefit for him to derive from allowing plaintiff on his boat. Id.
116. Rinn v. Minn. State Agric. Soc'y, 611 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000); Mcllrath v. Coll. of Saint Catherine, 399 N.W.2d 173, 174 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987) (citing Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647).
117. Erickson v. Curtis Inv. Co., 432 N.W.2d 199, 201 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
118. Zuercher v. N.Jobbing Co., 66 N.W.2d 892, 896 (Minn. 1954).
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have a duty to make sure that his home did not have any dangerous
conditions or activities on it that could potentially harm guests.119
Thus, a host would have some duty to act affirmatively for a guest,.... 120
but only with respect to the condition of the premises. However,
the duty to maintain a safe premises would not extend to observing
and diagnosing unforeseeable medical emergencies that could oc-
cur in the home. 2'
By relying on the above-established rule,12 Minnesota can
avoid the imposition of a blanket duty to protect, just as the Harper
court did, 2 3 on social hosts, and the already-crowded court dockets
will be spared additional litigation.
C. If A Future Social Host Duty Is Appropriate, It Must Be Strictly
Based On Existing Minnesota Law
In her brief, plaintiff in Gilbertson maintains that, pursuant to
the Depue holding, a social host duty to protect must be imposed. 1
4
However, as defendants aptly point out and the court recoqnized,
2
5
the Depue holding is inapplicable to the facts of the case. First,
since the defendant in Depue did not actually know of or appreciate
the plaintiffs condition, no duty could be imposed. 12  Secondly,
the Depue holding relied on the distinction between invitees and li-
censees, a distinction that has been abolished in Minnesota. 12s Fi-S .  129
nally, the Depue holding has been rejected by recent decisions as
119. Erickson, 432 N.W.2d at 201; Zuercher, 66 N.W.2d at 896.
120. Erickson, 432 N.W.2d at 201; Zuercher, 66 N.W.2d at 896.
121. Supra note 107 and accompanying text; See also Appellant's Br. at 16,
Gilbertson (No. C9-98-646) (stating that the occurrence of a medical emergency in
a host's home does not create a special relationship or justify the imposition of a
duty).
122. The established rule is that a property owner has a duty to maintain safe
premises. McIlrath v. Coll. of Saint Catherine, 399 N.W.2d 173, 174 (Minn. 1987)
(citing Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 174, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (1972)); Rinn
v. Minn. State Agric. Soc'y, 611 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
123. Appellant's Br. at 7, Gilbertson (No. C9-98-646).
124. Respondent's Br. at 11-12, Gilbertson (No. C9-98-646).
125. Gilbertson, 599 N.W.2d at 132 n.2 (stating that "Depue is not dispositive").
126. Appellant's Br. at 13, Gilbertson (No. C9-98-646).
127. Id. at 13-14.
128. Id. at 14. See also Peterson v. Balach, 199 N.W.2d 639, 647 (Minn. 1972)
(abolishing the distinctions in the status of land entrants when examining the duty
a landowner owes).
129. These recent decisions emphatically state that in the absence of a special
relationship, no duty to protect exists. Donaldson v. Young Women's Christian
Ass'n, 539 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Minn. 1995). The fact that an actor realizes or should
realize that he must take action to protect another does not of itself impose upon
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suffering from overbreadth. 3 °
Thus, even though Depue is still good law, it is inapplicable to
the specific facts of the Gilbertson case. 3 ' However, if in the future,
Minnesota courts find it necessary to impose a duty to protect on
social hosts, that duty must be based on a strict reading of Depue
and existing Minnesota law.
The Depue holding states that a person has an affirmative duty
to act on behalf of another if it is obvious that the other person will
be in danger if no action is taken.3 2 The operative word in the rule
is "obvious." That is, the host must know of or appreciate the
guest's condition before a duty to act is imposed.
It must be obvious to the host or a reasonable person in the
host's position that the guest is in need of protection based on the
problem or the guest's condition. 133 Otherwise, the burden placed
on the social host is far too great.134 Furthermore, if the risk is not
obvious, it becomes increasingly unforeseeable and if the risk is un-
foreseeable, then no duty to protect exists.
3 5
Not only must the risk be obvious, but the risk must also be
something that the social host is in a position to protect against and
is expected to protect against.136 As stated earlier, medical emer-
gencies cannot fall within this category because they are unex-
pected and unforeseeable.'" A guest simply cannot expect that a
social host, without medical training or knowledge, will be able to
protect against unforeseeable medical emergencies. 3 8 To force so-
him a duty to take such action unless a special relationship exists. Harper v. Her-
man, 499 N.W.2d 472, 474. See also Appellant's Br. at 14-15, Gilbertson (No. C9-98-
646).
130. Appellant's Br. at 15, Gilbertson (No. C9-98-646).
131. Id. at 7.
132. Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 303, 111 N.W.2d 1, 2 (1907).
133. Id.
134. As stated earlier, the law must not force a host to know of or inquire
about the guest's medical condition each time a guest is present in the host's
home. See discussion supra Part IV.B. This would be an overwhelming burden to
place on the host. It would inevitably lead to social hosts no longer having guests
in their homes for fear of the threat of possible litigation should something hap-
pen to the guest while in the host's home. Id. See also Appellant's Br. at 16,
Gilbertson (No. C9-98-646).
135. If the risk of harm is unforeseeable, then no duty to protect exists. Erick-
son v. Curtis Inv. Co., 447 N.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Minn. 1989); Delgado v. Lohmar,
289 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Minn. 1979).
136. Erickson, 447 N.W.2d at 168.
137. Supra note 107.
138. The Gilbertson court agreed with the assertion that a guest cannot expect
a social host to protect against unforeseen medical emergencies that happen to
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cial hosts to protect against unexpected and unforeseeable medical
emergencies is to foist far too great a responsibility on them. The




The Gilbertson decision is a correct interpretation of Minnesota
law as the social host/guest relationship is not recognized as a "spe-
cial relationship" and the risk of a medical emergency occurring in
the host's home is generally unforeseeable. Social hosts must not
be saddled with a blanket duty to protect their guests. A duty to
protect against sudden, unforeseen medical emergencies that oc-
cur in a host's home cannot be imposed because it is contrary to
existing law and public policy. Furthermore, the risk of a possible
medical emergency is unexpected and unforeseeable.
If such a duty proves to be necessary in the future, Minnesota
courts must keep in mind the basic premise of a duty to protect.
The risk to be protected against must not only be obvious and fore-
seeable, but it also must be something that the host is in a position
to protect against and something that the host should be expected
to protect against. A medical emergency, such as the one in the
Gilbertson case, presumably would be covered under such a duty to
protect.
arise in the host's home. Gilbertson v. Leininger, 599 N.W.2d, 127, 132 (Minn.
1999).
139. See discussion supra Parts IV.A, IV.B.
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